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THE FINE ART OF RUMMAGING:
SUCCESSORS AND THE LIFE CYCLE OF COPYRIGHT
EVA E. SUBOTNIK*
ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that a possible justification for the extension of
copyright beyond the death of the author is the key role that copyright
successors may serve in the life cycle of artistic works. In particular,
with respect to an artist’s unpublished work, a time-sensitive decision
must be made about whether or not to keep the physical artifacts
associated with copyrights—an obligation that often falls to these
successors. Bulky canvases, sketches, negatives, and myriad other items
must be sifted through in order to separate the wheat from the chaff. In
this way, the post-death cleanup period offers a once-in-a-lifetime event
in which copyright successors can serve a socially valuable function.

(This is a draft chapter. The final version will be available in The Research
Handbook on Art and Law edited by Jani McCutcheon and Fiona McGaughey,
forthcoming 2019, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. The material cannot be used for
any other purpose without further permission of the publisher, and is for private
use only.)
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INTRODUCTION
The death of the author figure has been the subject of great
critical debate.1 But, regardless of one’s position on that score, it is
beyond cavil that authors really do die.2 Under current copyright
law,3 it is likewise indisputable that virtually all copyright interests
still owned by an author at death pass to someone else.4
Nevertheless, the justifications for postmortem copyrights are still
highly controversial, particularly where the system of copyright
succession appears to reduce access to an author’s work.
Take the curious case of Vivian Maier, who spent much of
her working life as a nanny and whose photographic genius was not
discovered until 2007,5 not long before her death at the age of

1

Compare ROLAND BARTHES, The Death of the Author, in IMAGE, MUSIC, TEXT
142, 148 (Stephen Heath trans., 1988), and Michel Foucault, What Is an Author?,
in TEXTUAL STRATEGIES: PERSPECTIVES IN POST-STRUCTURALIST CRITICISM 141,
159–60 (Josué V. Harari ed., 1979), with Lionel Bently, Review, Copyright and
the Death of the Author in Literature and Law, 57 MOD. L. REV. 973, 973 n.6
(1994) (collecting sources that contest the poststructuralist view).
2
Other commentators have been similarly attracted to this rhetorical and
conceptual interplay. See generally Amy Lai, The Death of the Author:
Reconceptualizing 60 Years Later: Coming Through the Rye as Metafiction in
Salinger v. Colting, 15 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 19 (2010); Dawn Watkins, The
(Literal) Death of the Author and the Silencing of the Testator’s Voice, 24 LAW &
LITERATURE 59 (2012).
3
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 201, 302(a) (2016).
4
In the United States, there are some exceptions with respect to affiliated rights.
In particular, both moral rights under the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
(VARA) and the ability to trigger termination rights through the granting of
licenses are personal to the author and generally expire at the author’s death. See
17 U.S.C. §§ 106A(d)(1), (3), 203(a) (2016); Edward Lee, Suspect Assertions of
Copyright, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 379, 382 (2016) (“These rights are
more personal and are designed to protect the interests of authors, not the general
class of copyright owners.”); see also Laura A. Heymann, The Law of Reputation
and the Interest of the Audience, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1341, 1405 (2011) (“For
example, as with defamation law, an author’s rights under VARA last only for the
life of the author, which suggests a concern not with economic interests but with
the ability to engage in an ongoing dialogue with one’s audience.”).
5
PAMELA BANNOS, VIVIAN MAIER: A PHOTOGRAPHER’S LIFE AND AFTERLIFE 711, 264-68 (2017); see also Julia Gray, The Curious Case of Vivian Maier’s
Copyright,
GAPERS
BLOCK
(Aug.
13,
2013),
http://gapersblock.com/ac/2013/08/13/the-curious-case-of-vivian-maierscopyright/.
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eighty-three.6 Her work came into the hands of auction participants
when she stopped paying the bills on the five storage units that
housed her photographic work and other assorted belongings.7 It
was only when those buyers started rummaging through the boxes
that they discovered the treasure trove of photographs and motion
picture reels contained within—some in the form of prints, slides,
and negatives, and many others on thousands of rolls of film that
Maier herself had never even developed.8
While Maier’s story is highly unusual, it serves as a useful
vehicle because it affords an opportunity to focus exclusively on the
potential roles played by copyright successors. Specifically, it is
inconceivable that copyright incentives operated in any way to
encourage Maier to take her thousands of photographs9—she never
did anything with them during life, nor did she express any wishes
about how they should be exploited after her death.10 And following
Maier’s death, successors to her physical archive posted her work
online, mounted exhibitions, wrote books, and produced films and
videos that brought much favorable public attention to her work that

6

BANNOS, supra note 5, at 270-71.
Id. at 7-13, 268. The initial purchaser paid a total sum of $260 for the entire
contents of all five storage lockers. Id. at 8. Apparently, more of Maier’s
possessions—including newspaper clippings, clothes, and tchotchkes—were
contained in two additional storage lockers. Id. at 175. Yet, even there, potentially
hidden photographic gems were uncovered in the form of “a taped-shut leather
case that contained hundreds of rolls of undeveloped color film.” Id.
8
Id. at 9-11, 268-71. According to one source, “[t]here were about 2,000
undeveloped black & white rolls which we[re] [posthumously] processed and
scanned.” Vivian Maier FAQ’s, http://www.vivianmaier.com/ (last visited May
10, 2019).
9
On this topic more generally, see Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair
Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 515 (2009)
(“Copyright’s incentive model largely bypasses a persuasive account of creativity
that emphasizes a desire for creation, grounded in artists’ own experiences of
creation.”).
10
BANNOS, supra note 5, at 276 (noting “Maier’s choices to not share…her
photography”). Maier died intestate. Id. at 146, 231; see also Estate of Maier v.
Goldstein, No. 17 C 2951, 2017 WL 5569809, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 20, 2017) (on
a motion to dismiss). Nor, apparently, did she leave any detailed instructions that
her work be used to benefit some person or cause after her death (which might
have indicated that she was motivated by copyright after all in her photographic
endeavors). On the latter point more generally, see Eva E. Subotnik, Artistic
Control After Death, 92 WASH. L. REV. 253 (2017).
7
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she did not seek during her lifetime.11 And yet, because copyright
ownership does not travel with the material items to which it
pertains,12 the possibility of copyright enforcement by or on behalf
of remote relatives has threatened to restrain the work’s
circulation.13
Because of the tremendous power estates have to diminish
or even thwart public use of and access to copyright-protected
materials, many commentators decry the role of post-death
copyright successors in advancing the arts.14 As Australian arts
writer Katrina Strickland points out, “[c]opyright has … been an
effective tool for influencing what is written about an artist, and by
whom” because “an art book without images of the artist’s work is
severely hobbled.”15 In discussing the fallout between art historian
Janine Burke and Barbara Tucker over Burke’s hoped-for use of

11
BANNOS, supra note 5, at 127, 131, 153, 156, 175, 189, 191, 199-201, 208-12,
222-23, 232-33, 238-243.
12
17 U.S.C. § 202 (2016).
13
See, e.g., Estate of Maier, 2017 WL 5569809, at *2 (denying motion to dismiss
the Estate of Vivian Maier’s “copyright and trademark infringement case against
defendants Jeffrey Goldstein and Vivian Maier Prints, Inc., for allegedly
engaging in copying, public exhibition, and commercial exploitation of the
unpublished photographs of Vivian Maier”); BANNOS, supra note 5, at 272-79;
Randy Kennedy, The Heir’s Not Apparent: A Legal Battle Over Vivian Maier’s
Work,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
6,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/06/arts/design/a-legal-battle-over-vivianmaiers-work.html [https://perma.cc/FY8Q-JTX4]. The Cook County Public
Administrator has represented the Estate, BANNOS, supra note 5, at 273–74,
further complicating any notion of what approach to her intellectual property is
most in the public interest.
14
See Eva E. Subotnik, Copyright and the Living Dead?: Succession Law and the
Postmortem Term, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 77, 80–81 (2015) (collecting
commonly held views); see also RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW:
THE RISING POWER OF THE AMERICAN DEAD 144–47 (2010); Deven R. Desai, The
Life and Death of Copyright, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 219, 258–59; Robert Spoo, Ezra
Pound’s Copyright Statute: Perpetual Rights and the Problem of Heirs, 56 UCLA
L. REV. 1775, 1822–27 (2009); Michael Bradford Patterson, Note, To Speak,
Perchance to Have a Dream: The Malicious Author and Orator Estate as a
Critique of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s Subversion of the First
Amendment in the Era of Notice and Takedown, 22 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 177, 179–
80 (2014).
15
KATRINA STRICKLAND, AFFAIRS OF THE ART: LOVE, LOSS AND POWER IN THE
ART WORLD 194 (2013).
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images by the late painter Albert Tucker,16 Strickland perceptively
writes:
The problem in all cases like this is that history is
not objective. Offence can be taken over slights,
both
intentional
and
non-intentional,
communication breaks down and distrust sets in. It
happens in many fields; the difference here is the
widow has a weapon up her sleeve.17
Unlike the artists themselves,18 who can (at least
theoretically) claim to have invested their labor and personhood into
the creation of expressive works on the promise of copyright,19
copyright successors who acquire their rights from the artist after
death appear to be the most passive of copyright owners. No artists
are they; indeed, successors need not even display the hustle of a
publisher or distributor seeking to acquire rights from the artist
during life. It is only the sad but inevitable death of the artist that
causes copyright ownership to vest in these post-death successors.20
Once having acquired these rights, successors, driven by both
economic and non-economic motivations (such as grief,
protectiveness, or even hurt pride), can make life difficult for
would-be users.
While fully appreciating these concerns, this chapter argues
in favor of a more nuanced understanding of the roles played by
post-death copyright successors and the concomitant justifications

16

Id. at 196–202.
Id. at 200.
18
Admittedly, artists like Vivian Maier test the bounds of such a generalization
since her motives are so unclear.
19
Here I combine the three well-known justifications for intellectual property,
including copyright. See, e.g., 1 PETER S. MENELL, MARK A. LEMLEY, AND
ROBERT P. MERGES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE
2–26 (2018).
20
This (usually) involuntary transfer of rights provides a unique context in which
to consider what Justin Hughes termed a “paradox of personality and alienation”:
that “on most occasions the complete alienation of intellectual property is an
exercise of rights over property in an act that, by its nature, denies the personality
stake necessary to justify property rights.” Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of
Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 347 (1988).
17
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for postmortem copyrights.21 For, while there may be bad apples in
the barrel, beneficiaries and heirs can play a useful function in
“necromanagement.”22 Estates that own artists’ copyright interests
can serve as hubs of activity that aim to keep artists’ work relevant
and in living discourse.23 Most critically, where those copyrights are
associated with unpublished works, the prospect of copyright
protection (including the right of first publication) can serve as a
valuable incentive to beneficiaries and heirs to wade through the
reams of material left behind by an artist rather than deposit it all in
dumpsters. This impetus may be especially important in the visual
arts, where large canvases, heavy sculptures, and numerous sketches
and film negatives may occupy great amounts of physical space and
therefore may need to be dealt with quickly.
As will be discussed below, the positive influence of this
system of incentives acting upon post-death successors provides a
concrete and under-appreciated justification for postmortem
copyrights under both succession law and copyright law principles.
In short, the chapter argues that the post-death cleanup period offers
a once-in-a-lifetime event—coming at the end of an artistic
lifetime—in which successors to intellectual property rights can
serve a socially valuable function, especially in the visual arts.24 For
this reason alone, greater theoretical support for the role of postdeath copyright successors is perhaps in order.

21

For a different argument favoring a more nuanced view of intellectual property
successors, see Andrew Gilden, IP, R.I.P., 95 WASH. U. L. Rev. 639, 643–44
(2017) (arguing that the “mourning practices” of successors should be respected).
22
Gavin Edwards, One Man’s Mission to Keep Musicians’ Legacies Alive, N.Y.
TIMES (June 17, 2016) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
23
See, e.g., Michael Paulson, Beyond ‘Wonka’: They Want Every Kid to Know
Roald Dahl’s World, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2016) (“The goal, as the estate
prepares to celebrate the Sept. 13 centennial of Dahl’s birth, is wildly ambitious:
to have every child in the world engage with a Roald Dahl story.”).
24
Of course, just because copyright successors can serve a socially valuable
function does not mean that they will. For that reason, in forthcoming work I
argue in favor of an operative stewardship principle. See Eva E. Subotnik, Free as
the Heir?: Copyright Successors and Stewardship (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
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I. THE VIEW UNDER SUCCESSION LAW

Support for a system of private succession is generally
framed in terms of the donor’s perspective.25 Utilitarian
justifications for succession laws, for example, are often tied to
utility maximization goals that would be accomplished during the
decedent’s lifetime.26 In particular, the spur to productivity and to
the amassing of capital as well as the engendering of personal
satisfaction that come from the availability of individually directed
testation take place, if at all, during the decedent’s lifetime.27 In
parallel fashion, justifications for postmortem copyrights are
frequently based on anticipated incentive effects on authors
themselves.28 To be sure, in both contexts, it is also hoped that these
effects will inure to the benefit of society as a whole over time.29
The difficult question of incentive effects on decedents generally,
and on authors specifically, has been greatly debated in the
literature.30 This chapter instead focuses on the impact of such
systems on the surviving generations, which has not been as
thoroughly considered as part of the overall utilitarian calculation.

25

See, e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987) (“[T]he right to pass on
property—to one’s family in particular—has been part of the Anglo-American
legal system since feudal times.”); see also Naomi Cahn & Amy Ziettlow,
“Making Things Fair”: An Empirical Study of How People Approach the Wealth
Transmission System, 22 ELDER L.J. 325, 326 (2015) (describing this perspective
as a “canonical construct” within succession law).
26
See, e.g., Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the
Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 8 (1992). Wealth maximization is the best possible
gauge of utility maximization for some. Id.
27
Id. I include here the satisfaction that (theoretically) would come from knowing
that one’s close relatives will benefit if one opts for the default rules of intestacy.
28
See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 104–315, at 12 (1996) (“One of the reasons why people
exert themselves to earn money or acquire property is to leave a legacy to their
children and grandchildren.”).
29
See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of Succession in Social Perspective,
in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 14 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977)
(arguing that inheritance laws “help define, maintain and strengthen the social
and economic structure” of society); see also S. REP. NO. 104–315, at 11 (1996)
(“[T]he primary purpose of a proprietary interest in copyrighted works that is
descendible from authors to their children and even grandchildren is to form a
strong creative incentive for the advancement of knowledge and culture in the
United States.”).
30
See Subotnik, supra note 14, at 96–105 (describing and engaging with some of
the main arguments).
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Beginning with property succession more generally, there
are at least two related benefits for the surviving generations. First,
a persuasive argument can be made that without an orderly system
of succession, the property of the deceased would be seized by the
nearest taker.31 It does not take too much imagination to appreciate
that this prospect would devolve into undesirable social disruption
and chaos among the still-living as the strong began to hover over
the soon-to-die (perhaps even helping the process along) in order to
grab the newly freed-up property.32 In this way, an orderly system
of succession offers advantages to society as a whole—not just to
the actual recipients of a decedent’s property.
To be sure, a system of forced confiscation of decedents’
property by the state could probably provide the same benefit of
social order. But it would be costly,33 and it would likely not
produce the most efficient use of the property seized. Furthermore,
even under the view that this approach could pay for itself with the
property recovered from the recently departed, the prospect of this
approach—and certainly the prospect of a shift to it from our
current system—would likely cause too much distress among the
living to justify it under utilitarian principles.
A second benefit to private succession laws—addressing a
potential problem that flows from the first—is that current
succession laws produce a ready-made cadre of individuals with
incentives to clean up the detritus and organize the affairs of the
dead in a way that maximizes economic value.34 As is familiar to

31

See, e.g., MELVILLE MADISON BIGELOW, THE LAW OF WILLS FOR STUDENTS 8,
10-11 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1996) (1898).
32
Under the law, property is not left “up for grabs” at death—but in part, that is
because of how we define the term “property.” LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD
HANDS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS, TRUSTS, AND INHERITANCE LAW 15 (2009)
(internal quotation marks omitted). On the topic of “objects and entitlements that
defy th[e] norm” of a decedent’s right to property transfer at death, see David
Horton, Indescendibility, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 543, 543 (2014).
33
There are, of course, administrative costs produced by the current system of
individually directed wealth transmission. See, e.g., ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE
DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 48 (10th ed. 2017) (discussing the
costs of probate).
34
Cf. Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Succession—Its Past, Future and Justification: An
Introduction, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 5 (Edward C. Halbach,
Jr. ed., 1977) (noting the argument that “giving and bequeathing not only express
but beget affection, or at least responsibility”). Halbach here seems to refer
primarily to responsibility in the sense of taking care of one’s elders in their time

DRAFT OCTOBER 15, 2019

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3405536

2019]

LIFE CYCLE OF COPYRIGHT

anyone who has gone through the process, in order to most
efficiently use or sell the property left behind, the contents of a life
must be sorted through and either distributed to willing takers or
discarded. These tasks—so heavily grounded in the materiality of
physical objects—have particular resonance in contemporary life,
where the post-death cleanup process can be both rewarding and
onerous.35 As the journalist Alison Stewart recently put it:
Looking back, if I could have poured a truckload of
cement into that basement, filled the room to the
ceiling, and claimed I had no idea what happened, I
would have done so. It took me eight months to
clean out that house. Junk removal took over my
life.36
Indeed, for Stewart, one technique for summoning the
willpower to tackle the task at hand was to treat it like a job for
which she was “being paid to deal with all matters.”37 Despite the
emotional and physical toll that such endeavors require, however,
society is once again probably better off having this function
organized and performed by private parties, who can better sift the
wheat from the chaff,38 than by the state (or its agents39).
At first blush, the foregoing discussion about property
generally might appear to have no bearing on whether we should
have a system of individually devised copyrights—after all, the
essence of a work of authorship protected by copyright law is its
intangibility. So, it would seem, we need not worry in the abstract
of infirmity, but the notion of responsibility has obvious carryover to the tasks
that need to be done after death.
35
The devotion to Marie Kondo’s KonMari Method is one testament to the
contemporary problem of what to do with too much stuff. See MARIE KONDO,
THE LIFE-CHANGING MAGIC OF TIDYING UP: THE JAPANESE ART OF
DECLUTTERING AND ORGANIZING (Cathy Hirano trans., 2014); Penelope Green,
The Cult of Marie Kondo, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2016).
36
ALISON STEWART, JUNK: DIGGING THROUGH AMERICA’S LOVE AFFAIR WITH
STUFF xix (2016).
37
Id. at ix.
38
An arguable advantage to having a will is that one can choose successors who
one thinks will use the inherited assets most capably. See GEORGE W. THOMPSON,
THE LAW OF WILLS 21 (3d ed. 1947).
39
In theory, the state could try to employ experts to make these determinations,
but the costs would likely be prohibitive.
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about the strong overpowering the weak so as to seize intangible
works of authorship or about any related social unrest that might
ensue from a free-for-all following the artist’s death.40 Likewise,
there is no physical mess that must be sorted through in the case of
intangible works of authorship. Furthermore, any distress to the
artist’s survivors would come from lack of exclusive control over
works of authorship rather than from deprivation of access—
arguably a lesser pain to endure.41 Thus, if we once again set aside
the possible pre-death incentive effects on artists, and instead focus
on the surviving generations, the key social functions served by a
private system of succession seem absent as a basis for justifying
postmortem copyrights.
II. THE VIEW UNDER COPYRIGHT LAW
Copyright scholarship has also taken a largely dim view of
copyright succession.42 Scholars have been skeptical that
postmortem copyrights serve a net positive purpose, whether
viewed under utilitarian, natural rights, or personhood theories.43
This is so in part because of how protective and idiosyncratic
certain highly visible copyright successors have shown themselves
to be.44

40
The discussion here focuses on the question of whether, operating on a blank
page, we should extend copyrights beyond an author’s death. If, instead, we were
to focus on a jurisdiction that has already opted for postmortem copyrights (as is
common), problems analogous to those just discussed in the case of traditional
property would arise. For example, if the first taker could seize copyright
ownership from the dead, the same sort of social unrest would result. Likewise,
unraveling thorny copyright ownership issues following a death can be quite
labor and time intensive.
41
See Subotnik, supra note 14, at 113–14 (noting this distinction).
42
It might sound odd to suggest that a portion of a law (in this case, copyright
law) might be incompatible with itself. Here I refer to the widespread view that
postmortem copyrights are largely incompatible with the rest of copyright law’s
utilitarian thrust.
43
See generally Desai, supra note 14 (discussing the problems that attend
copyright’s extension beyond the life of the author and arguing against such a
system). To reiterate, this chapter puts aside the argument that such a system of
postmortem copyrights provides meaningful benefits and incentives to artists
while still alive. Instead, it concentrates on the effects of postmortem copyrights
on the surviving generations.
44
See, e.g., Spoo, supra note 14, at 1822 (noting that the “barriers erected by
heirs and estates to the use of unpublished materials … constitute … obstacles to
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Some scholars have tried to identify what benefits might
theoretically flow from copyright protection that is not aimed at
incentivizing authors to create new works but is provided for other
reasons.45 Specifically, Christopher Buccafusco and Paul Heald
have classified these non-“incentive-to-create” justifications
according to the harm they potentially prevent: underuse, overuse,
and tarnishment.46 Underuse reflects the concern that the
inexhaustible and nonexcludable “public goods” nature of
intangible works would discourage socially beneficial investments
in their use and dissemination because of the impossibility of
excluding free-riding competitors.47 For example, Publisher A
might hesitate to publish a high-quality artbook showcasing an
artist’s oeuvre if Publisher B, with access to state-of-the-art
technology, could freely copy the images, produce a competing
book, and undercut Publisher A’s operation. For this reason, Adam
Mossoff and others have called for renewed appreciation of the vital
role that copyright law plays for publishers.48

understanding the achievements of modernist writers”); see also MADOFF, supra
note 14, at 144–47; Gilden, supra note 21, at 642–43.
45
The context in that literature is typically the lengthening of copyright protection
available to already existing works, rather than a focus on copyright successors
per se. But the themes are similar and intersecting.
46
Christopher Buccafusco & Paul J. Heald, Do Bad Things Happen When Works
Enter the Public Domain?: Empirical Tests of Copyright Term Extension, 28
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 3, 13–17 (2013). Buccafusco & Heald ultimately reject
each of these justifications based on their empirical findings. Id. at 5, 37.
47
See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 105-452, at 4 (1998) (“Extending copyright protection
will . . . provide copyright owners generally with the incentive to restore older
works and further disseminate them to the public.”); William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471,
475, 488–91 (2003) (arguing that “an absence of copyright protection for
intangible works may lead to inefficiencies because of congestion externalities
and because of impaired incentives to invest in maintaining and exploiting these
works”).
48
Adam Mossoff, How Copyright Drives Innovation: A Case Study of Scholarly
Publishing in the Digital World, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 955, 957 (2015); id. at
969 (“Copyright provides the necessary incentives for scholarly publishers to
create, invest in, and sustain the business models that make possible the
dissemination of reliable, high-quality, standardized, networked, and accessible
research that meets the differing expectations of readers in a wide-ranging variety
of academic disciplines and fields of research.”); see also Wendy J. Gordon, The
Core of Copyright: Authors, Not Publishers, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 613, 635 n.91
(2014) (collecting sources).
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Overuse reflects the “tragedy of the commons” concern that
unrestrained overgrazing of an expressive work would undermine
its long-term value among consumers.49 To take an extreme
example, if a once beloved painting were suddenly to be found on
every billboard, screensaver, television commercial, giftwrap paper,
fabric print, and movie backdrop—especially if the use of other
images became concomitantly scarce in these settings—the
painting’s circulation value would plummet as the public tired of it.
Tarnishment reflects the concern that poor-quality or poortaste uses of expressive works would turn off potential audiences
for a work.50 Such uses might include pornographic, satirical, or
merely inferior reproductions of a work.51 In sum, as William
Landes and Richard Posner put it, in addition to the need to invest
upfront in the creation of intellectual property goods, “[i]nvestment
is necessary to maintain the value of the property as well, and also
to resurrect abandoned or otherwise unexploited intellectual
property.”52
Whatever one might think about these justifications,
however, it is not clear that copyright successors are always best
suited to maximizing the value of creative work once the author has
died.53 Ensuring that a work is neither underused nor overused may
take expertise in the author’s given field—expertise that family
relations or other loved ones may not possess.54 Likewise
49
See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 47, at 484-88; accord Michael Steven
Green, Copyrighting Facts, 78 IND. L.J. 919, 925–26 (2003); see also Michael
Abramowicz, A Theory of Copyright’s Derivative Right and Related Doctrines,
90 MINN. L. REV. 317, 321–22 (2005) (extending this argument to the derivative
work right). But see Dennis S. Karjala, Congestion Externalities and Extended
Copyright Protection, 94 GEO. L.J. 1065, 1076-85 (2006) (challenging this
thesis).
50
See Buccafusco & Heald, supra note 46, at 16–17; see also Dennis S. Karjala,
Harry Potter, Tanya Grotter, and the Copyright Derivative Work, 38 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 17, 35–36 (2006) (framing the “debasement” concern in natural right terms);
cf. Landes & Posner, supra note 47, at 486, 487–88.
51
Buccafusco & Heald, supra note 46, at 16–17; Green, supra note 49, at 925;
Karjala, supra note 50, at 36.
52
Landes & Posner, supra note 47, at 491.
53
Karjala, supra note 50, at 38 (“Moreover, after [J.K. Rowling’s] death, there is
no reason to believe that her successors in copyright ownership will have the
same ability to maintain and extend a coherent Harry Potter canon, or indeed a
better ability to do so than anyone else who is an intimate fan of the Potter
works.”).
54
See, e.g., Spoo, supra note 14, at 1827.
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tarnishment in some sense may be inevitable once an author has
died since no artistic choice with her contemporaneous imprimatur
will be possible. In other words, even granting “the interest of a vast
number of non-owners in having cultural objects with stable
meanings,”55 it is not clear who is in the best position to preserve
that meaning.
III. THE VIEW FROM THE FRONT LINES: UNPUBLISHED WORKS
Notwithstanding the discussion so far, a system of copyright
succession may advance the goals of both legal regimes (that is,
succession law and copyright law) when the focus narrows to one
specific area—the processing of many unpublished works that are
left behind. (Here, the reference is primarily to unpublished works
in the sense of works that the successors would be introducing to
the world for the first time.56) Copyright law in the United States
has in many respects moved toward a unitary approach to the
protection of works—whether published or unpublished.57
Nevertheless, in this context, a work’s unpublished status may
constitute a salient feature when considering justifications for
postmortem copyrights.
Anthony Reese has categorized these kinds of works to
include “works that have been kept entirely private.” 58 Artistic
55
See Justin Hughes, “Recoding” Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience
Interests, 77 TEX. L. REV. 923, 926 (1999); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright
and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 69
(1985) (noting that “[p]rotection for creators’ personal rights . . . also enables
society to preserve the integrity of its cultural heritage”).
56
A related justification could pertain to the culling of works that might have
technically been published at some time in the past but for which high-quality
copies are no longer available. In such instances, encouraging successors to
preserve the originals could add social value in an analogous way.
57
See Eva E. Subotnik & June M. Besek, Constitutional Obstacles?
Reconsidering Copyright Protection for Pre-1972 Sound Recordings, 37 COLUM.
J.L. & ARTS 327, 330 (2014) (describing this shift). This is so even as numerous
differences in treatment remain. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Toward a Functional
Definition of Publication in Copyright Law, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1724, 1725–26
(2008).
58
R. Anthony Reese, Public but Private: Copyright’s New Unpublished Public
Domain, 85 TEX. L. REV. 585, 595 (2007). On the potentially wide swath covered
by this category, see William M. Landes, Copyright Protection of Letters,
Diaries, and Other Unpublished Works: An Economic Approach, 21 J. LEGAL
STUD. 79, 93 (1992).
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works of this sort would include “notebooks, sketchbooks,
snapshots, and home movies, as well as business correspondence”
and “never-published versions of … works of visual art” that were
created “with an eye to publication that never occurred.”59 A second
category includes “preparatory works,” such as “sketches, models,
and preliminary studies for paintings, prints, [or] sculptures”
produced in the course of creating artwork that has already been
published.60
The value of this material will of course vary. For famous
artists, it might be quite commercially valuable; in other instances,
it might have value only for a small cadre of scholars and
historians.61 Furthermore, it is possible that the physical art objects
will be left to different persons than the copyright successors to the
artistic works contained therein.62 It is also possible that any
unpublished items of interest (whether artworks or personal effects)
will already be identified because they were housed in museums,
galleries, or archives during the artist’s lifetime.63 The point for
present purposes is that, with respect to unpublished works, society
has an interest in the optimal processing of the physical artifacts left
behind because, by definition, these artifacts embody copyrighted
works that exist in only one copy (or limited copies) and that have
not been seen by large audiences.64 And where the tangible goods
are left—along with a mountain of other items—to the same people
who inherit the intangible rights, those successors can help cull the
wheat from the chaff.

59

Reese, supra note 58, at 595.
Id. at 598. Reese also identifies a “third category, performed or displayed
works, [which] is made up of works that were publicly performed or exhibited but
were never technically published under copyright law, such as paintings only
displayed in museums … .” Id. at 595.
61
See, e.g., id. at 596-98.
62
See Subotnik, supra note 10, at 262.
63
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2016) (“A public performance or display of a work does
not of itself constitute publication.”); see, e.g., Salinger v. Random House, Inc.,
811 F.2d 90, 93 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting existence of unpublished letters “in the
libraries of Harvard, Princeton, and the University of Texas, to which they had
been donated by the recipients or their representatives”).
64
Cf. Joseph P. Bauer, Copyright and the First Amendment: Comrades,
Combatants, or Uneasy Allies?, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 831, 899-900 (2010)
(advancing the First Amendment interests of the public in some types of
unpublished materials).
60
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Such a function accords with the approach taken by the
United States Supreme Court, which has paid special attention to
situations in which copyrights pertain to particular tangible copies
of original works. Specifically, it determined that the
encouragement of “copyright holders to invest in the restoration and
public distribution of their works” through a term extension
applicable to already existing works was a constitutionally sound
goal under the Copyright Clause.65 Although offered in a different
context (that is, the permissibility of a term extension), the theme
resonates here.
There might be quite a lot of material to process, it should be
acknowledged, and this may affect whether, and how well, the
sifting process is undertaken. The widow of artist Herman Cherry
(1909-1992) put it thus:
[Herman] always said, “I’ve known too many
professional widows with a millstone around their
necks. Make a big bonfire. Give it away, or burn it.”
But he didn’t really mean that. . . .
The estate is quite large—about 450
paintings and about 1,300 works on paper. Most of
the paintings were stored in the basement of this
building, though not the works on paper. Shortly
after Herman’s death, I built these huge racks and
brought all the paintings up because it wasn’t safe
down there. We even had a flood once. Then I had
to list and photograph them, which took a long time.
I still have to transfer the inventory numbers onto
the actual paintings. I do this every time I take one
out. The works on paper are already labeled on the
back.66
In this context, a system of copyright inheritance—at least in
theory—can serve social welfare goals of both succession law and
65

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 207, 213 (2003); see also Golan v. Holder,
565 U.S. 302, 326 (2012) (“Evidence from the founding, moreover, suggests that
inducing dissemination—as opposed to creation—was viewed as an appropriate
means to promote science.”).
66
ARTISTS’ ESTATES: REPUTATIONS IN TRUST 82 (Magda Salvesen & Diane
Cousineau eds., Rutgers Univ. Press 2005) (quoting Cherry’s widow Regina
Cherry (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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copyright law. Such a system both avoids social disruption and
assembles a ready-made group of individuals with incentives not
only to publish but also—in the first instance—to take time (or to
spend money67) to sort through the files, stacks, and boxes left
behind in order to cull out the drafts, canvases, and other items of
value produced by the artist during life.68 Of course, unless they are
subject to fiduciary obligations,69 there is no requirement that
successors act with care and diligence with respect to the physical
materials that come into their possession or that they make the
works publicly available.70 As Reese thoughtfully demonstrates, it
seems unlikely that federal preemption would override state
property rights with respect to accessing tangible physical originals
that were kept private.71
Important additional counterarguments await and must be
dealt with. One principal objection is that since in many cases the
original physical items themselves might have value—for example,
one can auction off sketches through Sotheby’s or eBay (depending
on the artist)—the additional windfall of copyright ownership
serves little public purpose.72 For example, the daughter of Milton
67

In some instances, it might be more efficient for successors to outsource this
work to those knowledgeable in the deceased artist’s field.
68
Neil Netanel gestures in this direction in his argument in favor of a “term of the
life of the author plus five years for unpublished works, to give . . . authors’ heirs
an incentive to publish those works soon after the author’s death.” NEIL
WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 205 (2008).
69
On this aspect, see generally Subotnik, supra note 10. For a fascinating
discussion of the distinction between powers and duties in the context of
successors to moral rights, see Jani McCutcheon, Death Rights: Legal Personal
Representatives of Deceased Authors and the Posthumous Exercise of Moral
Rights, 2015 INTELL. PROP. Q. 242, 256 (“The [Legal Personal Representative]’s
power is expressed as a power to exercise moral rights, not as a duty or
obligation, so perhaps the LPR should be under no compulsion to act. However,
failure to act may cause harm to the author’s corpus, the author’s link with the
work or his reputation or honour as expressed in the work.”).
70
ARTISTS’ ESTATES: REPUTATIONS IN TRUST, supra note 66, at 132 (“Many
artists’ relatives are not interested in the art at all and just give or throw it
away.”).
71
See Reese, supra note 58, at 626.
72
For a distinction between visual and literary estates, see ARTISTS’ ESTATES:
REPUTATIONS IN TRUST, supra note 66, at 13 (quoting B.H. Friedman (internal
quotation marks omitted)):
A writer’s estate is quite different. You just really try to keep the work in print.
There’s little in terms of manuscripts that has any immediate value, but it has this
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Avery (1885-1965) stated, “When my father died, I cannot tell you
the condition the drawings were in, or how they were kept. It’s
embarrassing. I’ve spent literally years just trying to sort them
out.”73 But Avery’s paintings themselves have sold for millions of
dollars.74 Therefore, inherited copyrights, as distinct from the
inherited artworks and artifacts themselves, might not be necessary
to incentivize a carefully performed sifting and preservation
initiative.75 This dynamic may also be true of the Vivian Maier
estate, where some money to fund the preservation efforts appears
to have derived from the sales of Maier’s vintage prints and
negatives without the need for a copyright-backed sword with
which to pursue infringers.76
Indeed, to take the objection even further: to the extent that
copies of visual artworks have economic value in the marketplace,
perhaps that value derives from their being high-quality prints or
replicas—that is, reproductions that are made directly from the
original physical artifacts that the successors in my story already
control. Once again, this notion may well be true of aspects of the
Maier estate, where “many first-time collectors paid $1800, and up
to $3000, for a limited-edition print from a selection of Maier’s
negatives”77 and books by those with access to her negatives sold
well.78 Such a market reality would seem to obviate any benefit to
possibility of recurring value through being kept in print. There are very few
writers who make the kind of money that visual artists make today. It’s the
difference between things and words.
73
Id. at 156 (quoting Avery’s daughter March Avery (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
74
Id. at 159; see also Lot 22, The Collection of Joan and Preston Robert Tisch,
Milton Avery (1885-1965), Red Nude, CHRISTIE’S (May 22, 2018),
https://www.christies.com/lotfinder/paintings/milton-avery-red-nude-6141179details.aspx?from=salesummery&intobjectid=6141179&sid=5f09310b-982b4b6d-9d1a-4f55f6bd3696 (last visited May 10, 2019).
75
See generally Amy Adler, Why Art Does Not Need Copyright, 86 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 313 (2018) (casting doubt upon the role of copyright in the visual art
market); cf. Pascale Chapdelaine, The Undue Reliance on Physical Objects in the
Regulation of Information Products, 20 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 65, 119 (2015)
(discussing at length how the “over emphasis on the presence of a physical
object” affects IP policy in the digital era).
76
See BANNOS, supra note 5, at 271 (noting that Maier’s “own prints sell[] at
upward of $10,000 apiece” and that her negatives had been sold on eBay); see
also id. at 88, 95-99, 108-10, 188.
77
Id. at 198; see also id. at 199, 210-11, 231.
78
Id. at 191; see also id. at 210.
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the public from copyright control by successors.79 By contrast, with
literary works, fans arguably care less about the quality of the
reproduction than about the content of the unpublished story—
suggesting more of a justification for successor-owned copyrights in
the case of literary estates. To cast the distinction in slightly
different terms, one might say that there is less public interest in
close proximity to the “aura” of literary works.80
To these counterarguments, I offer the following responses.
First, with respect to the value of the originals: while some original
artworks may be worth millions (like Avery’s), in many cases they
will be worth much less. Accordingly, inheriting them—on their
own, without the relevant copyright interests—may provide an
insufficient incentive to sift and/or preserve.81 Second, with respect
to copies: it is increasingly likely that as copying technology
continues to improve, high-quality copies of artistic works will be
obtainable from third-party sources that the successors to the
physical artifacts do not control or benefit from, which would
likewise diminish their incentive to perform these functions absent
the relevant copyright interests. (This is certainly the case for
original artwork that is born digital.) Third, artistic estates contain
not just unpublished artworks but also unpublished writings of the
artists, which might suffer from free-riding competition, too.
Another objection emerges. Perhaps, at its core, the Maier
estate example could be read to support the opposite conclusion
from the one advanced in this chapter. After all, in Maier’s case
there were people ready, willing, and able to care for and exploit her
unpublished works82 without acquiring the relevant copyrights.83 In
79

On the separate question of whether those producing copies of Maier’s
photographs in these settings were permitted to do so under copyright law, see
infra note 83.
80
See WALTER BENJAMIN, The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological
Reproducibility, in 4 WALTER BENJAMIN: SELECTED WRITINGS, 1938-1940, at
251, 254 (Howard Eiland & Michael W. Jennings eds., Edmund Jephcott et al.
trans., Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2003).
81
With respect to bulk preservation of an artist’s estate, which can become
unmanageable and/or unaffordable, we might at least want to furnish successors
with incentives to digitally photograph artifacts that might have value.
82
As Jeffrey Goldstein, one principal acquirer of Maier’s physical materials, put
it (albeit in a self-serving way): “What the public now knows of Vivian Maier as
a photographer has been through the collective interpretation of Vivian Maier’s
negatives” by himself and his skilled team of technicians. BANNOS, supra note 5,
at 278 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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that way, “the [Vivian Maier] project is mostly paying for itself”84
without copyright ownership entering the picture. One art world
insider has likewise noted that “I know people whose specialty is to
go out and buy artists’ estates for very little cash. They’ll buy them
very, very cheaply and store them, then try to resell the individual
pieces—fine work, art of the fifties.”85
Nevertheless, most artists do not leave most of their worldly
possessions in a handful of storage lockers with an auctioning off
process readily at hand. In many cases, artists leave real property
teeming with items that need to be sorted through—and perhaps
sorted through quickly because of competing demands on the
physical space containing them. And, even if it were economically
efficient, it is not entirely clear that most successors would want to
permit strangers to traipse onto the property to cull out what might
be valuable. Furthermore, such a haphazard process could lead to
the dispersal of works in a disorganized fashion.86 Accordingly, in
the average case, it is at least conceivable that copyright
ownership—and its promise of exclusive control—is a stimulus to
copyright successors who are also the inheritors of the physical

83

Although some acquirers of Maier’s physical materials attempted to secure her
copyrights as well, that effort appeared to be more for the purpose of shielding
their own copying activities than for the purpose of needing copyright as an
incentivizing force to disseminate. See id. at 274-76. It should be noted, however,
that John Maloof, a principal acquirer of Maier’s physical materials and promoter
of her work, apparently paid $5000 for a full transfer of copyright from Maier’s
(possible) heir, id. at 275-76, and now asserts the following sword-like copyright
policy on his website:
All photographs appearing on this website and in the archive of the Maloof
Collection are copyrighted and protected under United States and international
copyright laws. The photographs may not be reproduced in any form, stored or
manipulated without prior written permission from the Maloof Collection.
Vivian Maier FAQ’s, http://www.vivianmaier.com/ (last visited May 10, 2019).
84
BANNOS, supra note 5, at 201 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
85
ARTISTS’ ESTATES: REPUTATIONS IN TRUST, supra note 66, at 133 (quoting
Anita Shapolsky (internal quotation marks omitted)).
86
See, e.g., id. (“You never know where that work will go, as they’re not willing
to share records or put any energy into keeping documentary photographs.”
(quoting Anita Shapolsky (internal quotation marks omitted))). Pamela Bannos
discusses the downsides to the wide dispersal of Maier’s prints and negatives at
length. See BANNOS, supra note 5, at 98, 108-09, 208-09.
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artifacts to take care either to preserve the potentially important
materials themselves or to hire experts to do so.
Admittedly, these responses are unlikely to convince those
scholars, like Wendy Gordon, who have argued that copyright law
and policy is driven, and should be circumscribed, by the need to
encourage creative output by authors.87 Such a perspective places
little to no weight on the role played by inheritors of copyright.
Indeed, Gordon argues that constitutional challenges to copyright’s
interference with free speech should gain strength when premised
merely on the ground of encouragement of “noncreative
dissemination standing alone.”88 A principal concern Gordon
expresses is that when copyright policy is untethered from fostering
creative acts, the argument for further extensions of the copyright
term—indeed, for a perpetual copyright term—becomes more
pronounced. After all, a would-be disseminator can always make
some colorable claim that copyright protection would encourage his
distribution of the work—even years after the author’s death.89
The very premise of this chapter—that we switch gears and
focus on potential benefits that flow from copyright’s effect upon
the surviving generations—is obviously at odds with her view. This
chapter suggests that a reason to aid noncreative disseminators
through copyright is the key moment in the life cycle when a
decision has to be made about whether or not to keep stuff. In other
words, while Gordon’s concerns are compelling, we can view the
post-death cleanup period as a once-in-a-lifetime event that need not
give rise to endlessly extended copyright.90 Furthermore, there
might still be another angle to assuage Gordon’s concerns:91 letting
an author’s survivors publish work she could no longer publish
because of an intervening death could be viewed as copyright in the
service of authorship. (Of course, this is a weaker argument if the

87

Gordon, supra note 48, at 617 (arguing that copyright’s primary concern is
stimulating creativity not dissemination).
88
See id. at 616-17.
89
Id. at 623-24, 631-32.
90
One basis for Gordon’s concern is further congressional expansions of
copyright. See id. at 618-19, 631. This chapter does not argue for expansions, but
rather seeks to determine whether there are justifications for aspects of the status
quo.
91
See id. at 631.
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artist never intended to publish the work.92) However, Gordon
herself goes so far as to say that under her proposal, aspects of the
current copyright law—such as Section 303(a)—might be
unconstitutional.93 That provision gave copyright holders an
incentive to publish by a certain date already existing unpublished
works so as to achieve an extended copyright term.94 Accordingly,
it simply may not be possible to convince those who stand with
Gordon on this score.
CONCLUSION
What this chapter has articulated about the life cycle of
copyright is not brand new under the sun. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme
Court long ago made this point in the case of unpublished literary
works:
What descendant, or representative of the deceased
author, would undertake to publish, at his own risk
and expense, any such papers; and what editor
would be willing to employ his own learning, and
judgment, and researches, in illustrating such
works, if, the moment they were successful, and
possessed the substantial patronage of the public, a
rival bookseller might republish them, either in the
same, or in a cheaper form, and thus either share
with him, or take from him the whole profits? It is
the supposed exclusive copyright in such writings,
which now encourages their publication thereof,
92

On the difference between work the author wanted to keep unpublished and
work she intended to publish but did not get around to publishing, see, e.g.,
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 554-55
(1985); Landes, supra note 58, at 90.
93
Gordon, supra note 48, at 677.
94
17 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2016) provides:
Copyright in a work created before January 1, 1978, but not theretofore in the
public domain or copyrighted, subsists from January 1, 1978, and endures for the
term provided by section 302. In no case, however, shall the term of copyright in
such a work expire before December 31, 2002; and, if the work is published on or
before December 31, 2002, the term of copyright shall not expire before
December 31, 2047.
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from time to time, after the author has passed to the
grave.95
Rather, this chapter has sought to demonstrate that, particularly in
the visual arts, which encumber successors with so many bulky
physical items to process, copyright may serve as an important
impetus for thoughtful preservation—and as a bulwark against the
pressing and understandable temptation to dump. In other words, if
dissemination is an important (albeit contested) objective of
copyright law, this chapter has tried to relate that objective to the
time, expense and physical exhaustion it takes to pack up the artist’s
studio.

95

Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 347 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass.
1841) (No. 4,901).
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